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This paper investigates how the dynamic adjustment of the European overnight rate
Eonia to the term spread and the ECB’s policy rate has been aﬀected by rate expec-
tations and the operational framework of the ECB. In line with recent evidence found
for the US and Japan, the reaction of the Eonia to the term spread is non-symmetric.
Moreover, the response of the Eonia to the policy rate depends on both, the repo auc-
tion format and the position of the Eonia in the ECB’s interest rate corridor.
Keywords: Monetary Policy Implementation, Term Structure of Interest Rates, Non-
linear Cointegration
JEL classiﬁcation: E43, E52Nontechnical Summary
For many central banks, including the European Central Bank (ECB) and the US Federal
Reserve, the interbank money market for overnight lending is the key channel through
which monetary policy is executed. Overnight rates are the operational target of monetary
policy that anchors the term structure of interest rates. Understanding the determinants
and the dynamics of the overnight rate is therefore of crucial importance for implementing
monetary policy in an eﬃcient way. This paper investigates how the dynamic adjustment
of the European overnight rate Eonia to the term structure and the ECB’s policy rate is
aﬀected by rate expectations and the operational framework of the ECB.
Our empirical setup for the analysis of the overnight rate dynamics emphasizes the
role of two separate relations driving the long-run behavior of the Eonia. One major
determinant of the level of the overnight rate is the central bank’s policy rate deﬁned as
the repo rate set in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations. A second long-run relation
is suggested by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure which implies that the
Eonia adjusts to the diﬀerence from a longer-term interest rate. Our empirical model
incorporates both eﬀects, taking account of persistent deviations of the Eonia from the
policy rate at the end of the monthly reserve maintenance period. These deviations are
found to represent a counterintuitive reaction of the Eonia to rate change expectations,
which can be explained by the disturbing inﬂuence of banks’ under- and overbidding on
the interbank market in the period before the ECB reformed its operational framework in
March 2004.
Similar to the US Federal funds rate target, the ECB’s ﬁxed repo rate seems to be a
symmetric policy rate. In contrast, one might expect that a minimum bid rate, as applied
by the ECB since June 2000, is particularly eﬀective in deﬁning a lower bound for interest
rates. Furthermore, the under- and overbidding episodes in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing
operations suggest that also the direction of expected rate changes aﬀected Eonia dynamics.
We therefore extend our base model and allow for non-symmetric adjustment to both long-
run relations, taking account of potential inﬂuences from monetary policy implementation
by the ECB. In particular, we investigate how the dynamic adjustment of the Eonia to
its long-run determinants depends on the June 2000 change in the auction format of the
ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations.
Our results indicate that the dynamics of the Eonia within the monthly reserve main-
tenance period depend on the auction format. Interestingly, the introduction of variable
rate tenders with a minimum bid rate in June 2000 did not lead to a loss of control of the
ECB over the Eonia. An asymmetric response to rate expectations is conﬁrmed for the
Euro Area, although this may partly mirror the over- and underbidding problems of the
auction format episodes.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
F¨ ur viele Zentralbanken wie z.B. die Europ¨ aische Zentralbank (EZB) und die US-ameri-
kanische Notenbank, ist der Interbankenmarkt f¨ ur Tagesgeld der Haupttransmissionkanal
ihrer geldpolitischen Maßnahmen. Der Zinssatz f¨ ur Tagesgeld ist das operationelle Ziel der
Geldpolitik, das die Zinsstrukturkurve verankert. Das Verst¨ andnis von Bestimmungsfak-
toren und Dynamik des Tagesgeldsatzes ist daher von entscheidender Bedeutung f¨ ur die
eﬃziente Implementierung der Geldpolitik. Dieses Papier untersucht, wie die dynamische
Anpassung des europ¨ aischen Zinssatzes f¨ ur Tagesgeld, Eonia, an die Zinsstrukturkurve
sowie an den Politikzins der EZB durch Zins¨ anderungserwartungen und den operationellen
Rahmen der EZB beeinﬂußt wird.
In unserem empirischen Ansatz zur Analyse der Dynamik des Eonia-Tagesgeldsatzes
wird die Bedeutung von zwei separaten Beziehungen, die das Langfristverhalten des Eonia
bestimmen, betont. Zum einen ist der Politikzins der Zentralbank eine wichtige Deter-
minante des Niveaus des Tagesgeldsatzes. Dieser Politikzins ist deﬁniert als der Reposatz
aus den Hauptreﬁnanzierungsgesch¨ aften der EZB. Zum anderen impliziert die Erwartungs-
hypothese der Zinsstrukturkurve die Anpassung des Tagesgeldsatzes an einen l¨ angerfristigen
Zinssatz. Unser empirisches Modell beinhaltet beide Einﬂ¨ usse und ber¨ ucksichtigt dabei per-
sistente Abweichungen zwischen Eonia und Politikzins am Ende der monatlichen Reserve-
haltungsperiode. Diese Abweichungen beruhen auf der kontraintuitiven Reaktion des Eonia
auf Zins¨ anderungserwartungen, die jedoch durch den verzerrenden Einﬂuß erkl¨ art werden
kann, den das Unter- und ¨ Uberbieten von Banken bei Oﬀenmarktgesch¨ aften vor der Reform
der EZB im M¨ arz 2004 auf den Interbankenmarkt ausge¨ ubt hatte.
¨ Ahnlich wie das Zinsziel f¨ ur die US-amerikanische Federal funds rate ist der Reposatz
der EZB ein symmetrischer Politikzins. Im Gegensatz dazu ist zu erwarten, daß ein Min-
destbietungssatz, wie er von der EZB seit Juni 2000 angewendet wird, vorrangig als untere
Grenze f¨ ur den Tagesgeldsatz wirkt. Dar¨ uberhinaus legt das Auftreten von Unter- und
¨ Uberbietungsverhalten in den Hauptreﬁnanzierungsgesch¨ aften der EZB nahe, daß auch die
Richtung von Zins¨ anderungserwartungen die Entwicklung des Eonia bestimmt hat. Wir
erweitern daher unseren Ansatz und modellieren eine nicht-symmetrische Anpassung des
Eonia an beide Langfristbeziehungen. Dabei wird der potentielle Einﬂuß der Implemen-
tierung der Geldpolitik durch die EZB ber¨ ucksichtigt. Insbesondere untersuchen wir, wie
sich die ¨ Anderung im Auktionsverfahren der EZB im Juni 2000 auf die dynamische An-
passung des Eonia an seine langfristigen Bestimmungsfaktoren ausgewirkt hat.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, daß die Entwicklung des Eonia-Tagesgeldsatz innerhalb der
monatlichen Reservehaltungsperiode vom Auktionsformat abh¨ angt. Allerdings hat die
Einf¨ uhrung des Zinstenders mit Mindestbietungssatz nicht zu einer geringeren Kontrolle¨ uber den Eonia durch die EZB gef¨ uhrt. Eine asymmetrische Reaktion auf Zins¨ anderungs-
erwartungen kann f¨ ur die Eurozone unterst¨ utzt werden, obwohl diese zum Teil die Probleme
des Unter- und ¨ Uberbietens in den untersuchten Zeitr¨ aumen widerspiegeln d¨ urfte.Contents
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Rate, the ECB’s Policy Rate and the Term Spread1
1 Introduction
For many central banks, including the ECB and the US Federal Reserve, the interbank
money market for overnight lending is the key channel through which monetary policy
is executed. Overnight rates are the operational target of monetary policy that anchors
the term structure of interest rates. Understanding the determinants and the dynamics
of the overnight rate is therefore of crucial importance for implementing monetary policy
in an eﬃcient way. This paper investigates how the dynamic adjustment of the European
overnight rate Eonia to the term spread and the ECB’s policy rate is aﬀected by rate
expectations and the operational framework of the ECB.
Our empirical setup for the analysis of the overnight rate dynamics emphasizes the
role of two separate long-run level relations. One major determinant of the level of the
overnight rate is the central bank’s policy rate deﬁned as the repo rate set in the ECB’s
main reﬁnancing operations (MROs). This direct inﬂuence of the ECB on the overnight
rate should imply that the policy spread between the Eonia and the repo rate is small
and, in particular, stationary. A second long-run relation is suggested by the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure. According to e.g. Campbell and Shiller (1987), the Eonia
should adjust to the term spread deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 3-month rate Euribor
and the Eonia. Therefore, our analysis of overnight rate dynamics starts with an error-
correction model for the Eonia that includes both, the policy spread and the term spread
as error-correction terms.
The relation between the Eonia and the policy spread might be aﬀected by the way
the policy rate is implemented by the central bank. In June 2000, the ECB switched from
ﬁxed rate to variable rate tenders in its main reﬁnancing operations. If the ﬁxed repo rate
entails a stronger signal about the policy-intended interest rate level than a minimum bid
rate, the introduction of variable rate tenders might have led to a partial loss of control
over short-term interest rates. We therefore investigate how the dynamic adjustment of the
1 Correspondence: Goethe University Frankfurt, Department of Money and Macroeconomics, Merton-
str. 17-21, 60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. E-mail: nautz@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de (D. Nautz),
offerman@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de (C.J. Oﬀermanns). We would like to thank Alain Durr´ e, Heinz Her-
rmann, Ulrike Neyer, and Julian Reischle for valuable comments and suggestions. Furthermore, we
would like to thank participants at a seminar in the Deutsche Bundesbank, the EEA Annual Congress
2005 and the Annual Meeting of the Verein f¨ ur Socialpolitik 2005. Financial support of the DFG is
gratefully acknowledged.
1Eonia to the policy rate depends on the MRO auction format. In particular, we compare
the period between January 1999 and June 2000 with the period between July 2000 and
March 2004.2
Similar to the US Federal funds rate target, the ECB’s ﬁxed repo rate seems to be a
symmetric policy rate. In contrast, one might expect that a minimum bid rate is particu-
larly eﬀective in deﬁning a lower bound for interest rates. Therefore, the Eonia adjustment
to the policy spread could be stronger if the Eonia is low relative to the minimum bid
rate. According to Ayuso and Repullo (2003), non-symmetric adjustment of the Eonia
would also be induced by an asymmetric loss function of the central bank. In a further
step of our analysis of the Eonia dynamics we therefore extend our base model and employ
non-symmetric error-correction equations.
Following Enders and Granger (1998) and Sarno and Thornton (2003) we also allow for
an asymmetric adjustment of the Eonia to the term spread. The under- and overbidding
episodes in the ECB’s MROs suggest that both, the direction of expected rate changes
(i.e., the sign of the term spread) and the MRO auction format aﬀect Eonia dynamics.
The impact of rate expectations on the Eonia as well as the persistence of deviations
from the policy rate were often particularly strong at the end of the monthly reserve
maintenance period. We therefore allow for diﬀerent Eonia dynamics at the end of the
reserve period. Our results indicate that irrespective of the applied auction format, the
end-of-period response of the Eonia to the term spread shows the wrong sign. However,
this counterintuitive reaction of the Eonia to rate expectations can be explained by the
disturbing inﬂuence of banks’ under- and overbidding on the interbank market in the period
under consideration.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the three interest rate series
under investigation and determines their integration and cointegration properties. Fur-
thermore, the econometric speciﬁcation is motivated and compared with the modeling
strategies of the empirical literature. Section 3 presents the results of a symmetric error-
correction equation of the Eonia and pays particular attention to the Eonia’s interesting
end-of-reserve-period dynamics. In Section 4, we use non-symmetric error-correction equa-
tions to investigate whether rate expectations, the position of the Eonia in the interest rate
corridor, and the MRO auction format aﬀect the dynamics of the Eonia within and at the
end of the reserve period. Section 5 summarizes our main results.
2 As of March 10, 2004, the maturity of the MROs was reduced from two weeks to one, and the reserve
period was re-scheduled to match the meetings of the Eurosystem’s Governing Council (see European
Central Bank, 2004) in order to mitigate the role of rate expectations on banks’ bidding behavior. We
restrict our analysis to the period before this reform to avoid a structural break.
22 Data and Econometric Speciﬁcation
2.1 (Co-)Integration Properties of the Data
The following empirical analysis uses daily data for the representative Euro overnight rate
Eonia3 (i), the 3-month money market rate Euribor (i3), and a key policy rate (i∗)o ft h e
ECB. Depending on the auction format, the policy rate i∗ is deﬁned as the ﬁxed repo rate
or the minimum bid rate set by the ECB in the ﬁxed or variable rate tenders applied in
its weekly main reﬁnancing operations. The sample period runs from January 2, 1999 to
March 9, 2004.
Over the whole sample period, the overnight rate is on average about seven basis points
above the ECB’s policy rate, see Table 1. Note that the average size of the policy spread
is merely unaﬀected by the MRO auction format. A slightly positive policy spread i−i∗ is
often called “natural” because the collateral cost for reﬁnancing via the interbank money
market and the ECB’s repo auctions diﬀer, see e.g. W¨ urtz (2003). The time series of the
Eonia, the policy rate, and the policy spread (i − i∗), are depicted in Figure 1.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Whole sample FRT period VRT period
Jan. 1999 – Mar. 2004 Jan. 1999 – Jun. 2000 Jun. 2000 – Mar. 2004
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
i 3.325 3.290 3.020 2.995 3.447 3.300
i∗ 3.252 3.250 2.950 3.000 3.373 3.250
i3 3.405 3.353 3.266 3.222 3.460 3.368
i − i∗ 0.073 0.050 0.070 0.060 0.074 0.050
i3 − i 0.079 0.063 0.246 0.183 0.013 0.029
Notes: First moments of the Eonia (i), the ECB policy rate (i∗), the 3-month Euribor (i3), the policy spread
(i − i∗), and the term spread (i3 − i). Sub-sample periods comprise the ﬁxed rate tender (FRT) and the
variable rate tender (VRT) period, respectively.
Apparently, the ECB has been very successful in steering the overall interest rate level
of short-term interest rates.4 Apart from a few outliers, typically occurring at the end of the
monthly reserve maintenance period, the Eonia follows the policy rate of the ECB closely.
Unit-root tests provide clear evidence that the Eonia should be treated as a non-stationary
3 The Euro OverNight Index Average (Eonia) is a weighted average of daily interest rates reported by a
panel of approx. 50 banks that have the highest business volume in the Euro Area money market. For
more information, see the Euribor website of the European Banking Federation at www.euribor.org.
4 The close relationship between the US Federal funds rate and the Fed’s interest rate target is documented
by e.g. Rudebusch (1995).
3or I(1) variable, see Table 2. Since the ECB varies its policy rate only infrequently and
clearly not on a daily basis, a standard unit-root test would not be appropriate for this
discrete-valued time series, see Hamilton and Jorda (2002). Yet Figure 1 shows that the
link between the Eonia and the partly deterministic policy rate is very much in line with
the notion of a long-run level relationship. In fact, as Table 2 shows, the policy spread
i−i∗ is clearly stationary. In this sense, the Eonia and the policy rate are cointegrated and
any equation explaining the dynamics of the Eonia should entail the lagged policy spread
as an error-correction term.
However, the link to the ECB’s policy rate is probably not the only relevant long-run
relation for understanding the dynamics of the Eonia. A second long-run or cointegrating
relationship relevant for the dynamics of the Eonia might be stirred by prevailing rate
expectations pinned down in the level of longer-term interest rates. The close relation
between the Eonia and the 3-month Euribor is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Euro Overnight Rate and the ECB’s Policy Rate
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Right scale: Euro Overnight Index Average (solid line) and ECB policy rate
(dashed line, up to June 26, 2000: repo rate, since June 27, 2000: minimum
bid rate). Left scale: Diﬀerence between both interest rates (policy spread).
The vertical line denotes the change from ﬁxed rate tender auctions to variable
rate tenders. Sample: January 2, 1999 – March 9, 2004.
4Table 2: Unit-Root Tests
Variable ADF Test Variable ADF Test Variable ADF Test
i −0.286 ∆i −10.555∗∗ i − i∗ −15.713∗∗
i3 −0.270 ∆i3 −8.996∗∗ i3 − i −3.482∗∗
Notes: t-statistics of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with a constant in the test equation and lag length
according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The 5% (1%) critical value is −2.863 (−3.434), signiﬁcance
is denoted by ∗ (∗∗). All test results are robust against variation of the lag length or the deterministics in the
test equation.
According to the expectation hypothesis of the term structure, i and i3s h o u l db e
cointegrated with a stationary term spread i3−i, see Campbell and Shiller (1987). Figure
2 nicely illustrates the signiﬁcance of the expectations theory for the short end of the term
structure. The term spread i3 − i is large and well above its median of 6.3 basis points in
times of rate hike expectations and small and sometimes even negative when interest rates
are expected to decrease. In line with Gaspar et al. (2001), this indicates that interest rate
changes of the ECB typically have been anticipated by the interbank market. Unit-root
tests provide further evidence for the stationarity of the term spread i3 − i, see Table 2.
Note that this result can easily be conﬁrmed by cointegration tests where the cointegrating
vector is not restricted to be (1,−1) a priori.
2.2 Modeling Overnight Rate Dynamics
The above cointegration analysis implies that a natural starting point of the empirical
analysis of the dynamics of the Eonia is an error-correction equation that incorporates
both, the lagged policy spread, i − i∗, as well as the lagged term spread, i3 − i, as error-
correction terms:
∆it = α(i−i∗)t−1+β(i3−i)t−1+δ∆i∗
t +
p 
k=1
φ1,k∆it−k +
q 
m=1
φ2,m∆i3t−m+θ Xt+εt (1)
where ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator and Xt is a vector of (0,1)-dummy variables captur-
ing e.g. calendar and end-of-reserve-period eﬀects.5 In Section 3, this empirical setup will
5 Speciﬁcally, Xt comprises dummies for the end of the quarter, of the semester, and of the year, as well
as a constant. We employ further dummies to account for irregular inﬂuences due to the Year-2000
eﬀect and the terrorist attacks at September 11, 2001, see Appendix.
5Figure 2: Euro Overnight Rate and 3-Month Euribor
-2
-1
0
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Right scale: Euro Overnight Index Average (solid line) and 3-Month Euro
Interbank Oﬀered Rate (dashed line). Left scale: Diﬀerence between both
interest rates (term spread). The vertical line denotes the change from ﬁxed
rate tender auctions to variable rate tenders. Sample: January 2, 1999 – March
9, 2004.
serve as the base model to investigate how the dynamics of the Eonia depend on prevailing
rate expectations and the way monetary policy is implemented by the central bank.
Typically, related studies dealing with daily overnight rates often have a diﬀerent focus
and thus, also diﬀerent modeling strategies and econometric speciﬁcations. The recent
empirical literature on the overnight rate was initiated by the seminal article by Hamilton
(1996). This paper had a strong focus on testing the martingale hypothesis.6 Therefore,
in order to test for predictable regularities of the Federal funds rate during the reserve pe-
riod, he speciﬁed the dynamics of the Federal funds rate by a simple autoregressive process
augmented, however, by dummy variables for each speciﬁc day of the reserve maintenance
period. To capture the increased volatility of the interest rate at the end of the reserve pe-
riod, the equation for the Federal funds rate is estimated in an EGARCH framework. Since
Hamilton (1996), the EGARCH model has been widely used for analyzing the martingale
6 The intuition of the martingale hypothesis is as follows: Since central banks typically allow reserve
averaging, funds should be perfect substitutes within a reserve period. Therefore, risk neutral banks
should arbitrage away any expected interest rate movements within a reserve period. As a consequence,
the interest rate should behave like a martingale, i.e. past observations should have no predictive content.
6hypothesis and the volatility of daily interest rates.
P´ erez Quir´ os and Rodr´ ıguez Mendiz´ abal (2005) use the EGARCH model to test the
martingale hypothesis for German and European overnight rates. Following Hamilton
(1996), the change of the overnight rate is explained by a set of dummy variables Xt
capturing calendar and end-of-reserve-period eﬀects:
∆it = θ Xt + εt (2)
Gaspar et al. (2004) use a similar model to analyze the individual interest rates reported
by the banks contained in the Eonia panel. Equation (2) does not account for adjustments
of the Eonia to the ECB’s policy rate or to the term spread.
Bartolini and Prati (2005) analyze the volatility pattern in daily overnight rates for
a whole set of countries, including the Euro Area. The focus of that paper is on how
interest rate volatility is aﬀected by cross country diﬀerences in monetary policy execution.
Therefore, they put much emphasis on the speciﬁcation of the variance equation of the
EGARCH model. For example, they allow the variance of overnight rates to depend on
the (squared) position of the interest rate in the central bank’s interest rate corridor.
In contrast, the speciﬁcation of the mean equation for the overnight rate contains less
economic structure and is very similar to Equation (2). Bartolini and Prati (2005) account
for a short-run impact of monetary policy on the overnight rate by including the change
of the policy rate ∆i∗ in the mean equation. However, for most countries, including the
Euro Area, they do not consider a long-run level eﬀect of the policy rate. In particular,
the policy spread i − i∗ is generally not incorporated in the mean equation.7
In a related paper, W¨ urtz (2003) focuses on the determinants of the policy spread i−i∗.
To that aim, he proposes a very comprehensive model that considers many institutional
details of the ECB’s operational framework. In particular, the equation for the policy
spread is non-linear in order to take into account that the Eonia is bounded by the corridor
set by the ECB’s standing facilities. With regard to the eﬀect of the MRO auction format,
it is found that ﬁxed rate tenders eﬀectively limit the downward potential of the spread.
However, in line with the impression given by the average size of the policy spread in Table
1, there is no evidence that ﬁxed rate tenders are more eﬀective than variable rate tenders
in keeping overall the overnight rate close to the policy rate. According to W¨ urtz (2003),
a crucial variable for the policy spread are expectations about changes in the ECB’s policy
rate.
7 The only exceptions are the equations for the US and pre-EMU France where banks are allowed to
carry reserve imbalances over to the next reserve period. Therefore, banks are able to arbitrage over
cross-period interest rate gaps. For that reason, Bartolini and Prati (2005) consider the inﬂuence of the
policy spread only at the ﬁrst day of the reserve period.
7The importance of interest rate expectations for the dynamics of the overnight rate
has been emphasized recently by e.g. Sarno and Thornton (2003). They estimate error-
correction equations for the US Federal funds rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate
including a stationary linear combination of the interest rates as error-correction term.8
Using non-linear error-correction equations, they ﬁnd that the adjustment of the overnight
rate to the Treasury bill rate is asymmetric. Speciﬁcally, the reaction of the Federal funds
rate is stronger whenever it is below its equilibrium value. According to Kuo and Enders
(2004) and Clarida et al. (2006), non-symmetric error-correction is also present in the
Japanese and the German term structure of interest rates. Note that these three papers
do not account for an inﬂuence of the policy rate (e.g., the Federal funds rate target) on
the dynamics of the overnight rate.
3 The Adjustment of the Euro Overnight Rate to the Policy
Rate and the Term Spread
3.1 The Base Model
Table 3 presents the estimates of the long run adjustment coeﬃcients, α and β, correspond-
ing to the error-correction equation of the Euro overnight rate as proposed in Equation
(1).9 Both adjustment coeﬃcients have the expected sign. On the one hand, the negatively-
signed adjustment to the lagged policy spread shows that the Eonia tends to return to the
interest rate level intended by the central bank. On the other hand, the Eonia tends to
increase when a positive term spread indicates rate hike expectations.
Table 3: Eonia Adjustment to Policy Spread and Term Spread
i − i∗ −0.261
(5.61)
∗∗
i3 − i 0.037
(1.55)
¯ R2 0.227
Notes: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcients of lagged policy and term spreads in Equation (1).
Absolute t-values in parentheses are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors, ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level.
The adjustment to the policy spread is both, economically and statistically signiﬁcant,
implying that approximately one quarter of the deviation of the Eonia from the policy rate
8 Note that Sarno and Thornton (2003) ﬁnd the linear combination i − 1.15 i3 to be stationary, not the
term spread.
9 The complete set of estimated coeﬃcients is shown in the Appendix.
8is eliminated in one day.10 In contrast, the inﬂuence from the term spread is considerably
weaker and even insigniﬁcant. However, this weak adjustment could be due to some ir-
regular behavior of the Eonia at the end of the reserve period. In the following section,
we will therefore consider an extension of the base model (1), where the adjustment of the
Eonia to both spreads may diﬀer at the end of the reserve period.
3.2 Eonia Adjustment Within and at the End of the Reserve Period
The dynamics of the Eonia depend on the central bank’s operational framework for its
liquidity management and banks’ reserve management strategies. In particular, since the
ECB allows averaging of reserve holdings within the monthly reserve maintenance period
(RMP), the volatility of the Eonia within the reserve period is typically low. At the end of
the period, however, liquidity shortages or excess reserves can lead to sharp interest rate
peaks and troughs, see Figure 1. The interest rate ﬂuctuations are usually most pronounced
at the very last day of the reserve period.11 Yet, due to the ECB’s reluctance to ﬁne-tune
the supply of reserves, the end-of-period eﬀects often already start immediately after the
last MRO of the reserve period.
End-of-period eﬀects in the Eonia are often related to rate expectations and banks’
bidding behavior in the ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations. Banks have a clear incentive
to underbid, i.e. to postpone reﬁnancing, whenever they expect an interest rate cut within
the current reserve period. Moreover, since bi-weekly repos overlapped in the next reserve
period until April 2004, banks may even have underbidden at the end of the reserve period.
This underbidding resulted in a lack of bids such that the ECB could not allot the intended
volume of reserves. In fact, on several occasions, the resulting lack of reserves forced many
banks to use the ECB’s marginal lending facility on a large scale and the Eonia sharply
increased until the end of the reserve period. Note that the interest rate increased although
underbidding occurred because banks expected interest rates to decrease. As a consequence,
at end-of-period days (i.e. after the last MRO) the reaction of the Eonia to the term spread
may even have a reversed sign. This disturbing inﬂuence of banks’ bidding behavior may
also be relevant in times of rate hike expectations. During the ﬁxed rate tender period,
rate hike expectations led banks to overbid, i.e. to exaggerate their demand for reserves. In
order to stop overbidding, the ECB repeatedly allotted too much reserves in their MROs.
As a result, in contrast to banks’ expectations, the Eonia fell dramatically at the end of
the reserve period.
10 Note that the short-run eﬀect of a change in the policy rate is signiﬁcantly positive but does not entail
a one-for-one change in the Eonia (ˆ δ =0 .324), see Appendix. This result is found to be very robust
over all speciﬁcations.
11 Similar end-of-period eﬀects are found by Furﬁne (2000) and Bartolini et al. (2001) for the US.
9Typically, end-of-period eﬀects in the overnight rate are modeled by the use of simple
dummy variables, thus treating at least the average size of the peak as a periodic deter-
ministic phenomenon, see Section 2.2. However, this approach to end-of-period eﬀects may
be misleading whenever the peaks in the interest rate are not predominantly positive or
negative, but can have both signs, as shown in Figure 1. In order to shed more light on the
Eonia dynamics, we therefore extend the base model (1) (that includes the usual dummy
variables) by allowing for diﬀerent adjustment dynamics of the EONIA during the end of
the reserve period. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the indicator variable I
eop
t to be one at days after
the last allotment in the reserve period until the end of the RMP and zero otherwise, and
estimate the following extended error-correction equation of the Eonia:
∆it = α1(1 − I
eop
t )(i − i∗)t−1 + α2I
eop
t (i − i∗)t−1
+ β1(1 − I
eop
t )(i3 − i)t−1 + β2I
eop
t (i3 − i)t−1 + ...+ θ Xt + εt
(3)
Note that the Eonia adjustment to the policy spread (α) or to the term spread (β)w i t h i n
(Ieop = 0) and at the end of the reserve period (Ieop =1 )i st h es a m ei fα1 = α2 or β1 = β2,
respectively.
The estimation results shown in Table 4 clearly indicate that the adjustment coeﬃcients
within and end of period are diﬀerent. For both spreads, Wald tests (see lower panel) reject
the equality of the adjustment coeﬃcients at the 5% signiﬁcance level. The extended
adjustment equation reveals that the link of the Eonia to both, the policy spread and the
term spread is in fact much closer within the reserve period. Although the adjustment
to the term spread is now also signiﬁcant and plausibly signed, the policy rate is still the
major determinant of the Eonia within the reserve period (|ˆ α1| =0 .367 > 0.108 = ˆ β1).
During the end of the period, however, the dynamics of the Eonia are very diﬀerent.
First, the estimated adjustment coeﬃcient of the policy rate is smaller in magnitude (|ˆ α2| =
0.164) and remains only weakly signiﬁcant. This shows that the inﬂuence of the policy rate
on the Eonia becomes weaker after the last MRO of the reserve period when reserves have to
be ultimately met without any further access to central bank reﬁnancing at that rate. For
the term spread, the diﬀerence in adjustment for within-period and end-of-period days is
even more pronounced. In contrast to the plausibly signed adjustment coeﬃcient estimated
within period (ˆ β1 =0 .108), the end-of-reserve-period eﬀect is signiﬁcantly negative (ˆ β2 =
−0.154) implying that e.g. the Eonia decreases in times of rate hike expectations.
The end-of-period adjustment coeﬃcients for the policy and the term spread are very
similar. In fact, testing the equality of the coeﬃcients (α2 = β2) yields a p-value of 0.878.
Accordingly, during the end of the period the two diﬀerent spreads can be combined to a
modiﬁed term spread where the Eonia is replaced by the policy rate: (it−i∗
t)+(i3t−it)=
i3t −i∗
t. This modiﬁed term spread has an interesting economic interpretation: at the end
10Table 4: End-of-Period Eﬀects in Eonia Adjustment
Unrestricted estimation Restricted estimation
within period end of period within period end of period
i − i∗ −0.367
(7.92)
∗∗ −0.164
(1.49)
−0.364
(7.65)
∗∗ −0.151
(2.25)
∗
i3 − i 0.108
(4.21)
∗∗ −0.154
(2.21)
∗ 0.108
(4.25)
∗∗ −0.151
(2.25)
∗
¯ R2 0.323 0.324
Wald Tests of Parameter Equality
H0: Same adjustment of the Eonia within and end of period
i − i∗ 0.041 0.004
i3 − i 0.000 0.001
Notes: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcients of lagged policy and term spreads. Absolute t-values in parentheses
are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%)
level. Wald tests of parameter equality are presented as p-values.
of the reserve period, the actual level of the Eonia loses its signiﬁcance for rate change
expectations. It is rather the policy rate that anchors the term structure in this particular
situation. The right panel of Table 4 shows the results for the restricted estimation. Note
that the coeﬃcient estimated for the modiﬁed term spread is highly signiﬁcant and still
has a counterintuitive sign.
The counterintuitive adjustment of the Eonia to the term spread at the end of the
reserve period can be reconciled with the under- and overbidding episodes outlined above.
For example, recall that expectations of declining interest rates caused banks to under-
bid which eventually drove the overnight rate up, not down. Therefore, the implausible
adjustment of the Eonia to the term spread might be due to the turbulences in the inter-
bank money market stirred by e.g. under- and overbidding of banks in the ECB’s main
reﬁnancing operations. This suggests to use the end-of-period coeﬃcient estimated for the
modiﬁed term spread as a measure for the disturbing inﬂuence of rate change expectations
on the Eonia dynamics and the ECB’s liquidity management.
In the following section, we investigate whether the dynamics of the Eonia within and
at the end of the period depend on rate expectations and the way monetary policy has been
implemented. In particular, we estimate the inﬂuence of the MRO auction format on the
Eonia dynamics. Moreover, following Nautz (1997) and Sarno and Thornton (2003), we
employ non-symmetric error-correction models to investigate whether the Eonia dynamics
depend on the sign of the (mean-adjusted) term spread and the position of the overnight
rate in the ECB’s interest rate corridor.
114 Asymmetries in Eonia Adjustment and the Impact of the
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The impact of the auction format: Fixed and variable rate tenders
During the ﬁrst 18 months of the Euro, the ECB used ﬁxed rate tenders in its main
reﬁnancing operations to allocate liquidity to the banking sector. In a ﬁxed rate tender,
the repo rate is pre-determined by the central bank, and banks can only indicate how much
reﬁnancing they would like to receive at that rate. Therefore, a ﬁxed repo rate contains a
very strong signal of the ECB about the intended level of short-term interest rates.
In June 2000, the ECB switched to variable rate tenders to stop the MRO’s escalating
overbidding problem, see Nautz and Oechssler (2003, 2005). In variable rate tenders, the
resulting repo rates partially depend on the bids of the banks and thus, are not under the
ECB’s full control. Since then, the ECB’s policy rate has been the MRO’s preannounced
minimum bid rate. With respect to the average policy spread, it is not clear whether the
ﬁxed repo rate had been more eﬀective than the minimum bid rate in keeping overall the
overnight rate close to the policy rate, compare Table 1. In the following, we will investigate
how the dynamic adjustment of the Eonia to the policy rate depends on the MRO auction
format. Speciﬁcally, we will interact the adjustment coeﬃcients with a dummy variable
(If, see Appendix) indicating the applied auction procedure.
Non-symmetric Eonia adjustment with respect to the policy spread
The ﬁxed repo rate is a symmetric policy rate in the sense that it is both, upper and lower
bound for the repo rate. Comparable to the working of the US Federal funds rate target,
it is in general not obvious whether the central bank is more concerned about overnight
rates below or above that policy rate. In contrast, a variable rate tender with a minimum
bid rate should be more eﬀective in deﬁning a lower bound for the bids and the resulting
repo rates. Therefore, using a minimum bid rate as the key policy rate might induce an
asymmetry in the Eonia dynamics. In particular, the adjustment of the Eonia should
be stronger when it is low relative to the policy rate, i.e. if the (mean-adjusted) policy
spread is negative. According to Ayuso and Repullo (2003), this asymmetry in the Eonia
dynamics would also prevail under the ﬁxed rate tender format if the central bank has an
asymmetric loss function in the sense that it is more averse to let interest rates fall below
the target than to let them exceed it.
In order to investigate the empirical relevance of these eﬀects, one has to extend the
standard symmetric error-correction equations estimated in the preceding section. In the
following, we consider non-symmetric error-correction equations for the Eonia, where the
12adjustment coeﬃcients may depend on the sign of the (mean-adjusted) policy spread, i.e.
on the position of the Eonia in the ECB’s interest rate corridor.12 Moreover, to control
for a possible impact of the tender procedure on this asymmetry, we will interact the
non-symmetric error-correction terms with the tender dummy If introduced above.
Non-symmetric Eonia adjustment with respect to the term spread
There is clear evidence that the Euro overnight rate is crucially inﬂuenced by interest
rate expectations, see e.g. W¨ urtz (2003). However, the impact of rate expectations on
the Eonia may depend on the direction of expected rate changes, i.e. on the sign of the
(mean-adjusted) term spread. For example, Sarno and Thornton (2003) and Kuo and
Enders (2004) showed that rate hike expectations have a particularly strong eﬀect on US
and Japanese overnight rates. In the Euro Area, the impact of rate expectations on the
interbank market was strongly aﬀected by the tender procedure applied in the ECB’s
MROs (until April 2004). Therefore, we will also allow for an asymmetric adjustment of
the Eonia to the term spread that depends on the applied auction format.
Summarizing, the extended adjustment equation of the Eonia is characterized as fol-
lows: ﬁrst, the Eonia adjustment is speciﬁed as a non-symmetric error-correction equation
where the asymmetry is implemented for both, the policy spread and the term spread. To
implement asymmetric adjustment, both spreads were mean-adjusted using their long-term
averages given by the respective median, see Table 1.13 Second, all adjustment coeﬃcients
may depend on the MRO auction format. Third, as in the preceding section, the adjust-
ment coeﬃcients may diﬀer within and at the end of the reserve period. Conﬁrming the
ﬁndings of the symmetric adjustment equation of the preceding section, the restriction that
the term spread and the policy spread have the same coeﬃcients for end-of-period obser-
vations (α2 = β2) still holds for the extended speciﬁcation. In the following we present the
results for this more parsimonious restricted speciﬁcation, but our results do not depend
on this choice.
Evidence on the Eonia adjustment within the reserve period
Table 5 shows the estimates of the adjustment parameters of the extended non-symmetric
error-correction equation of the Eonia.14 Let us ﬁrst look at the Eonia adjustment within
12 Non-symmetric error-correction models were introduced by Granger and Lee (1989). Nautz (1997)
used non-symmetric error-correction equations to show that the response of the German overnight rate
depends on the pricing rule applied in the variable rate tenders of the Bundesbank.
13 Note that the following results are robust with respect to alternative mean adjustments (e.g. using the
arithmetic mean).
14 For a presentation of the complete set of parameters, see Appendix.
13the reserve period. The p-values of the corresponding Wald tests shown in the lower left
part of the table are all below 0.05 indicating that - within period - the adjustment of
the Eonia depends for both spreads on its sign as well as on the auction format.15 For
the policy spread, the adjustment of the Eonia is signiﬁcantly stronger when the policy
spread is below average (i.e. for (i − i∗)−). Therefore, the ECB’s policy rate has been
more eﬀective in limiting the downward potential of the overnight rate. This ﬁnding is
plausible for the variable tender procedure where the minimum bid rate sets a ﬂoor on
the bids. However, supporting Ayuso and Repullo (2003), asymmetry is found irrespective
of the MRO tender procedure. In line with W¨ urtz (2003), we ﬁnd that the asymmetric
adjustment to the policy spread is even more pronounced during the ﬁxed rate period.
During that period, the adjustment coeﬃcient in case of a large policy spread ((i − i∗)+)
is very small (−0.048) and even insigniﬁcant. From this perspective, the introduction of
variable rate tenders improved the ECB’s control over the Eonia.
For the term spread, the kind of asymmetry also depends on the tender procedure.
Under the ﬁxed rate procedure, the adjustment coeﬃcient (0.516) is only signiﬁcant in
case of a negative term spread (i3 − i)− indicating rate cut expectations. In contrast,
under the variable rate procedure, there is only a signiﬁcant adjustment for (i3 − i)+, i.e.
in times of rate hike expectations.16 Note, however, that both situations, i.e. rate cut
expectations during the ﬁxed rate tender period and rate hikes under the variable rate
procedure, were more the exception than the rule, see Figure 2.
Evidence on the Eonia adjustment at the end of the reserve period
For both spreads and irrespective of the tender procedure, there is no evidence of asym-
metric adjustment of the Eonia at the end of the reserve period. This is conﬁrmed by
the p-values of the corresponding Wald tests reported in the lower right part of Table 5.
The large standard errors of the estimated adjustment coeﬃcients may partly be due to
the relatively small number of end-of-period observations for each of the diﬀerent episodes.
However, conﬁrming the results of the symmetric speciﬁcation in Section 3, the estimated
adjustment coeﬃcients of the Eonia to the (modiﬁed) term spread show the counterintu-
itive negative sign in each case. In fact, restricting all end-of-period coeﬃcients to be equal
(such that asymmetry is only allowed within period) yields an adjustment coeﬃcient of
−0.15 which is signiﬁcant at the 5%-level and very close to the estimate obtained in Section
15 Table 5 reads as follows: the p-value corresponding to the null hypothesis that e.g. during the variable
rate period (VRT) the within period adjustment of the Eonia is symmetric with respect to the policy
spread (i − i
∗)i s0 .017.
16 Sarno and Thornton (2003) report a similar asymmetry in the adjustment of the US Federal funds rate
to the Treasury bill rate.
14Table 5: Non-symmetric Adjustment and the Impact of the Tender Procedure
within period end of period
FRT VRT FRT VRT
(i − i∗)+ −0.048
(0.92)
−0.321
(4.27)
∗∗
(i − i∗)− −1.004
(10.50)
∗∗ −0.619
(6.69)
∗∗
(i3 − i)+ 0.012
(0.32)
0.286
(5.36)
∗∗
(i3 − i)− 0.516
(3.14)
∗∗ −0.022
(0.46)
(i3 − i∗)+ −0.156
(1.71)
−0.201
(1.07)
(i3 − i∗)− −0.269
(0.26)
−0.095
(0.58)
¯ R2 0.395
Wald Tests of Parameter Equality
H0: Symmetric adjustment for positive and negative spreads
within period end of period
FRT VRT FRT VRT
i − i∗ 0.000 0.017
i3 − i 0.004 0.000
i3 − i∗ 0.915 0.716
H0: No impact of MRO auction format on Eonia adjustment
within period end of period
+ − + −
i − i∗ 0.002 0.001
i3 − i 0.000 0.001
i3 − i∗ 0.811 0.863
Notes: Estimated adjustment coeﬃcients of lagged policy and term spreads. Asymmetric error-correction
terms are corrected for ”natural” spreads by subtracting the median. FRT and VRT diﬀerentiate between the
ﬁxed and variable rate tender period, + and − diﬀerentiate between positive and negative observations for
the respective expression. Absolute t-values in parentheses are computed using heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors, ∗ (∗∗) denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% (1%) level. Wald tests of parameter equality are
presented as p-values.
3. Thus, the switch to the variable rate tender procedure had no signiﬁcant impact on the
end-of-period dynamics of the Eonia. Moreover, the behavior of the Eonia during the last
days of the reserve period appears to be counterintuitive irrespective of the prevailing rate
expectations and the position of the Eonia in the ECB’s interest rate corridor.
155 Conclusion
This paper investigated the dynamic relationship between the Euro overnight rate (i), the
3-month Euribor (i3) and the ECB’s key policy rate (i∗). In a ﬁrst step, we established that
both, the policy spread (i − i∗) and the term spread (i3 − i) are stationary implying that
the dynamic relation between these interest rates should be modeled in an error-correction
framework. In particular, the Eonia may adjust to the lagged policy spread as well as to
the lagged term spread.
Our results indicate that the within-period dynamics of the Eonia depend on the auction
format. Interestingly, the introduction of variable rate tenders with a minimum bid rate
in June 2000 did not lead to a loss of control of the ECB over the Eonia. Since June 2000,
the link between the Eonia and the ECB’s policy rate is even strengthened when the policy
spread tends to increase. For both auction formats, the Eonia adjustment is signiﬁcantly
stronger when the policy spread is relatively low. Following Ayuso and Repullo (2003),
this pattern of the Eonia dynamics could be due to asymmetric preferences of the central
bank with regard to the sign of the policy spread.
Particular attention was paid to the dynamics of the Eonia during the last days of the
reserve period. We found that end-of-period, the inﬂuence of the policy rate on the Eonia
remains only weak and that its response to the term spread even shows the wrong sign.
We argued that these seemingly implausible end-of-period dynamics of the Eonia partly
reﬂect the market’s reaction to banks’ over- and underbidding behavior in the ECB’s main
reﬁnancing operations. For example, due to banks’ underbidding the ECB could not allot
the intended volume of reserves. As a consequence, the Eonia often sharply increased at
the end of the reserve period even though banks underbid because they expected interest
rates to decrease.
In March 2004, the ECB redesigned its operational framework of monetary policy in
order to mitigate the distorting impact of rate expectations on banks’ bidding in MROs
and the dynamics of the Eonia. The empirical framework proposed in this paper might be
useful for evaluating the success of these measures. Considering the lack of strong interest
rate change expectations up to the most recent past, future will have to show whether the
observed counterintuitive end-of-period behavior of the Eonia still maintains or not.
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18A Appendix
Table A.1: Complete Speciﬁcation: Base Model
Variable Coeﬃcient t-statistic
i − i∗ −0.2613 −5.6121
i3 − i 0.0365 1.5527
∆i∗ 0.3242 5.0436
∆i−1 0.0282 0.6377
∆i−2 −0.0373 −1.1958
∆i−3 −0.0065 −0.2425
∆i−4 −0.0217 −0.9151
∆i−5 −0.0053 −0.2420
∆i3−1 0.2839 2.1960
∆i3−2 0.1341 0.5469
∆i3−3 0.4256 2.5347
∆i3−4 −0.3871 −2.0751
∆i3−5 0.1318 1.0241
dY 2K (Dummy for Year-2000 eﬀect)0 .4061 6.5863
dSep11 (Dummy for Sep.-11 eﬀect)0 .1349 20.3581
Ieop (Dummy for end-of-period day) −0.0433 −2.5897
dfirst (Dummy for ﬁrst day of RMP)0 .0869 2.3688
deoq (Dummy for end of quarter)0 .0673 3.3401
deos (Dummy for end of semester)0 .1594 3.0523
deoy (Dummy for end of year)0 .0964 1.2494
constant 0.0045 1.6980
Notes: Estimates of the base speciﬁcation (Eq. (1)). ∆i−k and ∆i3−k denote the k-th lag of
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of i and i3, respectively. t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors (HCSE).
19Table A.2: Complete Speciﬁcation: End-of-Period Eﬀects in Eonia Adjustment
Unrestricted estimation Restricted estimation
Variable Coeﬃcient t-statistic Coeﬃcient t-statistic
(1 − Ieop) · (i − i∗) −0.3667 −7.9225 −0.3640 −7.6507
(1 − Ieop) · (i3 − i)0 .1079 4.2053 0.1082 4.2460
Ieop · (i − i∗) −0.1642 −1.4900 −0.1509 −2.2475
Ieop · (i3 − i) −0.1535 −2.2126 −0.1509 −2.2475
∆i∗ 0.3604 6.1186 0.3585 6.2019
∆i−1 0.0275 0.6875 0.0241 0.6163
∆i−2 −0.0321 −1.1935 −0.0349 −1.1866
∆i−3 −0.0093 −0.3844 −0.0117 −0.4572
∆i−4 −0.0159 −0.6848 −0.0176 −0.6578
∆i−5 0.0074 0.3564 0.0062 0.2784
∆i3−1 0.3156 1.9727 0.3124 1.9694
∆i3−2 0.1749 0.7097 0.1749 0.7107
∆i3−3 0.3236 1.8469 0.3205 1.8403
∆i3−4 −0.3269 −2.0874 −0.3268 −2.0898
∆i3−5 0.0032 0.0290 0.0004 0.0032
dY 2K 0.3459 5.0418 0.3463 5.0379
dSep11 0.1398 21.0670 0.1400 21.0682
Ieop 0.0647 2.3422 −0.0337 −2.2204
dfirst −0.0337 −2.2193 0.0647 2.3429
deoq 0.0627 2.7929 0.0633 2.7937
deos 0.1680 3.3683 0.1673 3.3511
deoy 0.1307 1.6474 0.1302 1.6410
constant 0.0083 3.2004 0.0082 3.1636
Notes: Estimates of the extended speciﬁcation diﬀerentiating between within-period (Ieop = 0) and end-of-
period days (Ieop = 1) in the adjustment to the policy spread and the term spread (Eq. (3)). The restricted
estimation is performed under the condition that the end-of-period adjustment to both spreads is the same.
For the deﬁnition of variables see Table A.1. t-statistics are computed using HCSE.
20Table A.3: Complete Speciﬁcation: Asymmetric Eonia Adjustment
Variable Coeﬃcient t-statistic
(1 − Ieop) · If · (i − i∗)+ −0.0478 −0.9155
(1 − Ieop) · If · (i − i∗)− −1.0035 −10.495
(1 − Ieop) · If · (i3 − i)+ 0.0122 0.3249
(1 − Ieop) · If · (i3 − i)− 0.5155 3.1357
(1 − Ieop) · (1 − If) · (i − i∗)+ −0.3210 −4.2690
(1 − Ieop) · (1 − If) · (i − i∗)− −0.6192 −6.6926
(1 − Ieop) · (1 − If) · (i3 − i)+ 0.2857 5.3623
(1 − Ieop) · (1 − If) · (i3 − i)− −0.0218 −0.4591
Ieop · If · (i3 − i∗)+ −0.1560 −1.7146
Ieop · If · (i3 − i∗)− −0.2686 −0.2592
Ieop · (1 − If) · (i3 − i∗)+ −0.2008 −1.0712
Ieop · (1 − If) · (i3 − i∗)− −0.0948 −0.5796
∆i∗ 0.3780 4.4580
∆i−1 0.0692 1.9058
∆i−2 −0.0022 −0.0783
∆i−3 0.0048 0.2048
∆i−4 0.0020 0.0798
∆i−5 0.0030 0.1470
∆i3−1 0.2620 1.9430
∆i3−2 0.1872 0.8561
∆i3−3 0.3704 2.3847
∆i3−4 −0.2996 −2.3267
∆i3−5 0.0037 0.0420
dY 2K 0.4012 6.3152
dSep11 0.1447 23.5150
Ieop −0.0067 −0.2849
dfirst −0.0259 −1.1122
deoq 0.0628 3.3104
deos 0.1732 3.6354
deoy 0.1011 1.3406
constant −0.0135 −3.2131
Notes: Estimates of the extended speciﬁcation allowing for asymmetric adjustment to the policy
spread and the term spread as well as for diﬀerent adjustment coeﬃcients under the ﬁxed rate
tender (If =1 )a n dt h ev a r i a b l er a t et e n d e r( If = 0). Asymmetric error-correction terms are
corrected for “natural” spreads by subtracting the median. For the deﬁnition of variables see
Table A.1. t-statistics are computed using HCSE.
2123
The following Discussion Papers have been published since 2005: 
Series 1: Economic Studies 
  1  2005  Financial constraints and capacity adjustment 
      in the United Kingdom – Evidence from a   Ulf von Kalckreuth 
      large panel of survey data    Emma Murphy 
  2  2005  Common stationary and non-stationary  
      factors in the euro area analyzed in a  
      large-scale factor model    Sandra Eickmeier 
  3  2005  Financial intermediaries, markets,  F. Fecht, K. Huang, 
     and  growth    A.  Martin 
  4  2005  The New Keynesian Phillips Curve  
      in Europe: does it fit or does it fail?  Peter Tillmann 
  5  2005  Taxes and the financial structure   Fred Ramb 
      of German inward FDI    A. J. Weichenrieder 
  6  2005   International diversification at home   Fang Cai 
      and abroad  Francis E. Warnock 
  7  2005  Multinational enterprises, international trade,  
      and productivity growth: Firm-level evidence   Wolfgang Keller 
      from the United States  Steven R. Yeaple 
  8  2005  Location choice and employment   S. O. Becker, 
      decisions: a comparison of German   K. Ekholm, R. Jäckle,  
      and Swedish multinationals  M.-A. Muendler 
  9  2005  Business cycles and FDI:  Claudia M. Buch 
      evidence from German sectoral data  Alexander Lipponer 
 10  2005  Multinational firms, exclusivity,   Ping Lin 
      and the degree of backward linkages  Kamal Saggi 24
 11  2005  Firm-level evidence on international   Robin Brooks 
      stock market comovement  Marco Del Negro 
 12  2005  The determinants of intra-firm trade: in search  Peter Egger 
      for export-import magnification effects  Michael Pfaffermayr 
 13  2005  Foreign direct investment, spillovers and   
      absorptive capacity: evidence from quantile  Sourafel Girma 
     regressions  Holger  Görg 
 14  2005  Learning on the quick and cheap: gains   James R. Markusen 
      from trade through imported expertise  Thomas F. Rutherford 
 15  2005   Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion:    
      evidence from German treasury auctions  Jörg Rocholl 
 16  2005   Consumption, wealth and business cycles:  B. Hamburg,  
      why is Germany different?  M. Hoffmann, J. Keller 
 17  2005   Tax incentives and the location of FDI:  Thiess Buettner 
      evidence from a panel of German multinationals  Martin Ruf 
 18  2005   Monetary Disequilibria and the  Dieter Nautz 
      Euro/Dollar Exchange Rate  Karsten Ruth 
 19  2005  Berechnung trendbereinigter Indikatoren für 
      Deutschland mit Hilfe von Filterverfahren  Stefan Stamfort 
 20  2005   How synchronized are central and east 
      European economies with the euro area?  Sandra Eickmeier 
      Evidence from a structural factor model  Jörg Breitung 
 21  2005   Asymptotic distribution of linear unbiased  J.-R. Kurz-Kim 
      estimators in the presence of heavy-tailed   S.T. Rachev 
      stochastic regressors and residuals  G. Samorodnitsky 25
 22  2005   The Role of Contracting Schemes for the  
      Welfare Costs of Nominal Rigidities over  
     the Business Cycle    Matthias Paustian 
 23  2005  The cross-sectional dynamics of German  J. Döpke, M. Funke 
      business cycles: a bird’s eye view  S. Holly, S. Weber 
 24  2005  Forecasting German GDP using alternative  Christian Schumacher 
      factor models based on large datasets 
 25  2005  Time-dependent or state-dependent price  
      setting? – micro-evidence from German 
      metal-working industries –    Harald Stahl 
 26  2005  Money demand and macroeconomic  Claus Greiber 
     uncertainty    Wolfgang  Lemke 
 27  2005  In search of distress risk  J. Y. Campbell,  
        J. Hilscher, J. Szilagyi 
 28  2005   Recursive robust estimation and control   Lars Peter Hansen 
      without commitment  Thomas J. Sargent 
 29  2005   Asset pricing implications of Pareto optimality  N. R. Kocherlakota 
      with private information  Luigi Pistaferri 
 30  2005   Ultra high frequency volatility estimation  Y. Aït-Sahalia,  
      with dependent microstructure noise  P. A. Mykland, L. Zhang 
 31  2005   Umstellung der deutschen VGR auf Vorjahres- 
      preisbasis – Konzept und Konsequenzen für die 
      aktuelle Wirtschaftsanalyse sowie die ökono- 
     metrische  Modellierung  Karl-Heinz  Tödter 26
 32  2005  Determinants of current account developments 
      in the central and east European EU member  
      states – consequences for the enlargement of  Sabine Herrmann 
      the euro erea  Axel Jochem 
 33  2005  An estimated DSGE model for the German  
      economy within the euro area  Ernest Pytlarczyk 
 34  2005  Rational inattention: a research agenda  Christopher A. Sims 
 35  2005  Monetary policy with model uncertainty:  Lars E.O. Svensson 
      distribution forecast targeting  Noah Williams 
 36  2005  Comparing the value revelance of R&D report-  Fred Ramb 
      ing in Germany: standard and selection effects  Markus Reitzig 
      
 37  2005  European inflation expectations dynamics  J. Döpke, J. Dovern 
        U. Fritsche, J. Slacalek 
 38  2005  Dynamic factor models  Sandra Eickmeier 
       Jörg  Breitung 
 39  2005  Short-run and long-run comovement of 
      GDP and some expenditure aggregates 
      in Germany, France and Italy  Thomas A. Knetsch 
 40  2005  A“wreckers theory” of financial distress  Ulf von Kalckreuth 
 41  2005  Trade balances of the central and east 
      European EU member states and the role   Sabine Herrmann 
      of foreign direct investment  Axel Jochem 
 42  2005  Unit roots and cointegration in panels  Jörg Breitung 
       M.  Hashem  Pesaran 
 43  2005  Price setting in German manufacturing: 
      new evidence from new survey data  Harald Stahl 27
  1  2006  The dynamic relationship between the Euro 
      overnight rate, the ECB’s policy rate and the  Dieter Nautz 
      term spread  Christian J. Offermanns 28
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 
  1  2005  Measurement matters – Input price proxies  
      and bank efficiency in Germany  Michael Koetter 
  2  2005  The supervisor’s portfolio: the market price 
      risk of German banks from 2001 to 2003 –  Christoph Memmel 
      Analysis and models for risk aggregation  Carsten Wehn 
  3  2005   Do banks diversify loan portfolios?   Andreas Kamp  
      A tentative answer based on individual   Andreas Pfingsten 
      bank loan portfolios  Daniel Porath 
  4  2005   Banks, markets, and efficiency  F. Fecht, A. Martin 
  5  2005   The forecast ability of risk-neutral densities  Ben Craig 
      of foreign exchange  Joachim Keller 
  6  2005   Cyclical implications of minimum capital 
     requirements  Frank  Heid 
  7  2005  Banks’ regulatory capital buffer and the  
      business cycle: evidence for German   Stéphanie Stolz 
      savings and cooperative banks  Michael Wedow 
  8  2005  German bank lending to industrial and non- 
      industrial countries: driven by fundamentals 
      or different treatment?    Thorsten Nestmann 
  9  2005  Accounting for distress in bank mergers  M. Koetter, J. Bos, F. Heid 
          C. Kool, J. Kolari, D. Porath 
 10  2005  The eurosystem money market auctions:   Nikolaus Bartzsch 
      a banking perspective    Ben Craig, Falko Fecht 
 11  2005  Financial integration and systemic  Falko Fecht 
     risk    Hans  Peter  Grüner 29
 12  2005   Evaluating the German bank merger wave  Michael Koetter 
 13  2005   Incorporating prediction and estimation risk   A. Hamerle, M. Knapp, 
      in point-in-time credit portfolio models  T. Liebig, N. Wildenauer 
 14  2005   Time series properties of a rating system   U. Krüger, M. Stötzel, 
      based on financial ratios    S. Trück 
 15  2005   Inefficient or just different? Effects of   J. Bos, F. Heid, M. Koetter, 
      heterogeneity on bank efficiency scores  J. Kolatri, C. Kool 31
Visiting researcher at the Deutsche Bundesbank 
The Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt is looking for a visiting researcher. Among others 
under certain conditions visiting researchers have access to a wide range of data in the 
Bundesbank. They include micro data on firms and banks not available in the public. 
Visitors should prepare a research project during their stay at the Bundesbank. Candidates 
must hold a Ph D and be engaged in the field of either macroeconomics and monetary 
economics, financial markets or international economics. Proposed research projects 
should be from these fields. The visiting term will be from 3 to 6 months. Salary is 
commensurate with experience. 
Applicants are requested to send a CV, copies of recent papers, letters of reference and a 
proposal for a research project to: 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Personalabteilung
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14 
D - 60431 Frankfurt 
GERMANY